The effects of Europe’s weaponisation of time have also been felt among civil rescuers. Rather than simply a “failed system”, however, these delays in rescue need to be understood as strategic - and deliberate - elements built into the current system of European migration governance. Attacks on refugee boats and their interception off the coast of Tunisia, where racist sentiments have escalated over recent weeks, have also soared.Ī 2021 report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights suggested that “the damage and death along the central Mediterranean route … is the result of a failed system of migration governance”, emblematic of which are the “significant delays and failures to render assistance to migrant boats”. Routinely guided by European aerial assets, these Libyan forces chase after boats still intact enough to reach Europe while often neglecting stationary boats with people needing immediate help. Since 2017, Libyan forces have forcibly returned more than 100,000 people to torturous conditions, often using speed boats donated by Italy. The measurable impact of these aerial surveillance operations has been elsewhere. But its use of “aerial assets under its current strategy has not had a meaningful impact on the death rate”, Human Rights Watch and Border Forensics recently noted. Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, often justifies these activities as aimed at saving lives. Intensified aerial activities, including via drones, search for boats with refugees in the central Mediterranean. Meanwhile, EU member states have shifted to the skies. Especially in the search and rescue (SAR) zones of Malta and Libya, rescue often comes too late, as recent days have tragically demonstrated once more. That currently many boats are reaching Italy, with the government declaring a state of emergency in April, does not deny the fact that Italy and Malta continue to leave vast stretches of the sea unattended. Italy has also reduced its operational scope, mostly to the areas close to Lampedusa and Sicily. “Non-assistance is now a routine part of a suite of deadly measures aimed at reducing arrivals in Malta,” the report said. So far in 2023, only 92 people have been rescued to Malta. The report said that in 2022, Maltese authorities ignored more than 20,000 people in distress 413 boats with people needing help were not assisted and only three boats were rescued by Malta’s armed forces. This vacuum has expanded over time: A report published in March 2023 by the Civil Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, a network of non-governmental actors engaging in Search and Rescue activities in the Mediterranean, concluded that “at sea, Maltese authorities regularly abandon those in need of rescue”. By further withdrawing their rescue assets, European actors have produced a rescue vacuum in the central Mediterranean.

In the period since 2017, which my article calls the phase of strategic neglect, EU member states have found even more draconian ways to weaponise time. The consequence - that arriving late at scenes of distress, or not at all, would lead to a rise in deaths - was clearly acceptable. Mare Nostrum ended and gave way to successive European operations that experimented with delays in emergency responses.ĮU naval operations Triton and Sophia, which followed Mare Nostrum in 20, built delays into their operational designs, intentionally patrolling areas of the Mediterranean Sea where few boats were expected. However, it was denounced by critics as a “pull-factor” that would incentivise the arrival of refugees. As a response to a devastating shipwreck on Octonear Lampedusa, this operation sped up rescue activities off the Libyan coast, leading to the rescue of about 150,000 people.

The end of Italy’s humanitarian-military operation Mare Nostrum in 2014 marked a turning point. Over the last decade, and in order to prevent arrivals, European Union authorities have sought out ways to slow down rescue engagement while accelerating interceptions to Libya. In a study recently published in the journal Security Dialogue, I argue that time has become increasingly “weaponised” in Mediterranean migration governance.

Still, offering a speedy response in such situations is not one of Europe’s priorities. Any delay in the emergency response can lead to serious bodily harm or the loss of life. When boats with refugees are at risk of capsizing in the Mediterranean Sea, the speed of rescue operations is essential.

Call of the sea secret achievements